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PROPOSED REVISIONS OF
THE M'NAGHTEN RULEt
CONTROVERSY OF LONG STANDING in the administration of justice has
/ been the defense of insanity in criminal law. Re-examination of the
law in this area was recently stimulated in New York State by a conference
held under the auspices of the Department of Mental Hygiene to consider
and make recommendations to the legislature as to the retention or amend-
ment of the pertinent section of the Penal Law.'
As the test to determine whether a defendant, alleged to have been
insane, should be held responsible for his criminal act, New York has
statutorily embodied the M'Naghten rule2 in Section 1120 of the Penal
Law, the second paragraph of which reads:
A person is not excused from criminal liability as an idiot, imbecile,
lunatic, or insane person, except upon proof that, at the time of committing
the alleged criminal act, he was laboring under such a defect of reason as:
I. Not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or
2. Not to know that the act was wrong. "
This test is generally referred to as the "right-and-wrong rule' 4 although
the abbreviation is somewhat inaccurate. The M'Naghten rule was formu-
lated in the course of an inquiry by the House of Lords in 1843 directed
to the judges of England.: M'Naghten had been acquitted of the murder
of the secretary to Sir Robert Peel on the ground of insanity and the
judges were requested to clarify the law in this area by responding to five
theoretical questions. The "test" has been adapted from the following
passage:
... [T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."
t Prepared by the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
I Berman, Is It Time to Revise the McNaughton Rule Relating to the Defense of
Insanity in Criminal Law?, 29 N.Y.S. BAR BULL. 407 (1957).
2 See M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
3 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1120.
4 GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 403 (1952); Sobeloff,
Insanity and the Criminal Law: From McNaghten to Durham, and Beyond, 41
A.B.A.J. 793 (1955). See, e.g., Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800-01 (1952).
5 M'Naghten's Case, supra note 2, at 202-03, 8 Eng. Rep. at 720.
6 M'Naghten's Case, 10 CI. & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843).
Of the cases which preceded M'Naghten
in the development of the rule, Rex v.
Arnold,7 Ferrers' Case,8 and Hadfield's
Case9 appear the most significant, although
the general concept of exculpability on the
ground of insanity goes far back in the
common and civil law.' 0 Knowledge of
right and wrong in a general sense was
established as a test at the time Ferrers'
Case was decided in 1760.11 The M'Nagh-
ten test, however, specifically calls for
knowledge of right and wrong as to the
criminal act with which the defendant is
charged.' 2
Controversy over the form and substance
of the rule ranges from the meaning of its
key words to the very spelling of M'Nagh-
ten.' 3 The use of the disjunctive "or," giv-
ing the rule its two branches, means simply
that the defendant is excused either in the
event that he did not understand the nature
and quality of the act, or in the event that
he did not know that the act was wrong.' 4
7 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (1724), frequently de-
scribed as setting forth the "wild beast test" al-
though the judge's remarks were not intended
to be taken literally. S. GLUECK, MENTAL Dis-
ORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 139 n.2 (1925);
HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
495-97 (1947).
8 19 How. St. Tr. 885 (1760).
)27 How. St. Tr. 1281 (1800), an aberrational
case in which defendant's acquittal on the basis
of insane delusion was largely attributable to
Erskine's eloquence. S. GLUECK, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 147-48; GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN,
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 152 (1952).
10 See People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 331, 110
N.E. 945, 946-47 .(1915); S. GLUECK, Op. Cit.
supra note 7, at 123-25.
31 S. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 142, 144.
12 M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cf. & Fin. 200, 210, 8
Eng. Rep. 718, 722-23 (H.L. 1843).
13 See Pigney v. Pointer's Transp. Services Ltd.,
(1957) 1 Weekly L.R. 1121, 1122 ed. n. (Assizes);
Note, The Real McNaughton, 74 L.Q. REV. 1
(1958).
14 People v. Horton, 308 N.Y. 1, 123 N.E.2d 609
(1954).
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"Nature" and "quality" have been deemed
synonymous and usually to mean no more
than physical, sensate quality - not emo-
tional appreciation of the significance or
consequences of the act. 1 Some courts
seem to hold that knowing the nature and
quality of the act merely means knowing
that the act is wrong.1 6 "Wrong" in New
York State means moral wrong,' 7 not legal
wrong as interpreted in some other juris-
dictions.' 8
Near-unanimous acceptance was ac-
corded the M'Naghten rule although it was
early subjected to criticism.' 9 It is the law
in at least forty-four states and in most of
the British Commonwealth. 20 As a modifi-
cation, fourteen states have added the so-
called "irresistible impulse" test.2' In New
Hampshire2 2 and the District of Columbia' 3
the M'Naghten test has been rejected - by
the latter jurisdiction in 1954. New York
State accepted the M'Naghten rule in
People v. Kleim 24 in 1845; the legislature
17 See HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
LAW 501 (1947).
16 Ibid.
'7 People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 110 N.E. 945
(1915).
Is See, e.g., McElroy v. State, 146 Tenn. 442, 242
S.W. 883 (1922); Harrison v. State, 44Tex. Cr.
164, 69 S.W. 500 (1902); Regina v. Windle, 2
Q.B. 826, 2 All E.R. 1 (1952).
, See, e.g., 2 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMI
NAL LAW IN ENGLAND 153 (1883).
20 See ALl, MODEL PENAL CODE, Appendix A
§ 4.01, at 161 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The four
exceptions are Rhode Island (probably adheres to
M'Naghten), Georgia (delusional impulse test),
Montana (test unclear) and New Hampshire
(Pike-Durham "product" test, see text infra).
Ibid. But see State v. Kitchens, 129 Mont. 331,
286 P.2d 1079, 1082 (1955), where the court
indicated adherence to the M'Naghten rule.
21 See ALl, note 20 supra.
22 State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869); State v.
Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871).
23 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).
24 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 13 (N.Y. 1845).
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codified it in 1881; 21 and the courts have
applied it without modification. M'Naghten
received detailed review in People I'.
Schmidt,26 where Judge Cardozo noted the
harsh criticism of the rule. More recently,
Judge Van Voorhis' lone dissent in People
v. Horton27 decried the focus of the test
upon intellectual disorientation.
Treatment of the Rule in the
Federal Courts
In the federal jurisdiction, the M'Nagh-
ten rule has been supplemented by the
"irresistible impulse" test which received
Supreme Court approval in Davis v. United
States2s in 1897. The military jurisdiction
has also adopted this modification. -'9 In
Leland v. Oregon30 the Supreme Court re-
cently noted the strides of psychiatry but
pointed out that its progress had ". . . not
reached a point where its learning would
compel [the Court] . . . to require the
states to eliminate the right and wrong test
from their criminal law." 31
The history of M'Naghten was radically
altered in Durham v. United States32 by
the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in 1954. The rule was specifically
rejected as the sole criterion of criminal
responsibility and the New Hampshire
"product" test (considered infra) ordered
applied as a substitute on retrial. 33
Some indication of future treatment of
25 Laws of N.Y. 1881, c. 676, as amended by Laws
of N.Y. 1882, c. 384, § 21.
26216 N.Y. 324, 338-39, 110 N.E. 945, 949
(1915).
27308 N.Y. 1, 16-23, 123 N.E.2d 609, 616-21
(1954).
28 165 U.S. 373 (1897).
29 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 200 (1951).
30 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
31 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 801 (1952).
32 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
33 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
the M'Naghten rule in the Supreme Court
of the United States may be gleaned from
critical statements by two present Justices.
Appearing before the Royal Commission
on Capital Punishment, Justice Frankfurter
did not ". . . see why the rules of law should
be arrested at the state of psychological
knowledge of the time when they were
formulated. . . ,,14 Justice Douglas opined
-in an article that ". . . the only warrant for
the M'Naghten rule of insanity was tradi-
tion."a3
Criticisms of the M'Naghten Rule
What then are the essential criticisms of
the M'Naghten rule? The crux of the com-
plaint that M'Naghten is obsolete is that
the rule fails to recognize the universally
accepted principle that the human mind
and personality are integrated as to the
cognitive, volitive and affective capacities,
and that these elements may not be com-
partmented. M'Naghten, it is claimed, is a
product of a rationalist era, acknowledging
only the cognitive or intellectual faculty
and does not allow for the incapacity of the
will or the influence of the emotions. While
an individual may understand both the
nature of his act and its wrongfulness (cog-
nition), he may nevertheless, due to mental
3a Royal Commission on Capital Punishment,
1949-53, REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932, at 102 (1953).
35 Douglas, The Durham Rule: A Meeting Ground
for Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 41 IowA L. REV.
485, 494-95 (1956). The Court's statement in the
Leland case, asserting the right to change the law
at some future time, represents a change from an
earlier position. "For this Court to force the
District of Columbia to adopt such a requirement
[the New Hampshire rule] for criminal trials
would involve a fundamental change in the com-
mon law theory of responsibility .... Such a radi-
cal departure from common law concepts is more
properly a subject for the exercise of legislative
power or at least for the discretion of the courts
of the District." Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S.
463, 476 (1946).
illness, be either unable to will to avoid it
(volition), or be so emotionally deranged
(affection) as to be irresponsible.36
To this criticism it may be answered that
the rule is founded upon fundamental con-
cepts of free will and individual responsi-
bility which are basic to criminal law,17
and was clearly not the whim of a particu-
lar era.38 Overemphasis of the influence of
the emotions or of the unconscious mind is
regarded as tending toward determinism
and undermining the paramountcy of the
intellect. 39
Another central objection to the rule is
that it narrows the inquiry into mental dis-
order by its focus upon knowledge and thus
hamstrings psychiatrists in their efforts to
assist the court.49 The question of "right
36 See S. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW 264-66 (1925); HALL, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 492-99 (1947);
Royil Commission on Capital Punshment, 1949-
1953, REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932, at 80 (1953);
WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL
LAw 409-10 (1933).
37 GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND
THE LAW 408 (1952).
38 Cavanagh, A Psychiatrist Looks at the Durham
Dec'sion, 5 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 25, 50 (1955);
Hall, Responsibilty and Law: In Defense of the
McNaghten Rules, 42 A.B.A.J. 917 (1956).
"I) Cavanagh, note 38 supra; McDonnell, The
Right-Wrong Test, 21 J.B.A.D.C. 389 (1954);
Report of the Special Committee on the Rights of
the Mentally Ill, 70 A.B.A. REP. 338 (1945).
A psychiatrist writes: "The psychiatrist con-
siders logical thinking one of the more secondary
activities of the human organism, certainly ex-
ceeded in power by the emotions." Modlin, The
Position of the Psychiatrist in the Administration
of the Criminal Law, 4 KAN. L. REV. 350, 351-52
(1956).
41) "The McNaghten rule requires medical wit-
nesses to testify in terms that to them are artificial
and confining. A doctor can offer expert judgment
when he talks of illness, disease, symptoms and
the like. When he is forced to adopt the vocabu-
lary of moral;ty and ethics, he is speaking in what
to him is a foreign language and in an area in
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and wrong," some psychiatrists feel, has no
meaning to their field since this is an ethical
or metaphysical question and beyond their
scope."' The very word "insanity" is a legal
one and meaningless to the psychiatrist.
When attempting, then, to analyze broadly
a defendant's mental condition, the psy-
chiatrist is abruptly restricted.
To the claim that insanity is inade-
quately, even ridiculously, defined, it is
pointed out that the definition does not pur-
port to be a medical one but is simply a
criterion of responsibility.' 2 The determina-
tion to be made by the jury is a legal, not
medical, one.43 Further, on the lexico-
graphic question, the ultimate problem of
responsibility is in fact a moral one - hence
which he claims no expertness." Sobeloff, Insanity
and the Criminal Law: From McNaghten to Dur-
han, and Beyond, 41 A.B.A.J. 793, 877 (1955).
"A very large part of the confusion which almost
invariably results in the trial of the criminal
defendant alleged to be insane, lies in the fact
that the law insists that the psychiatrist deal with
mental states and conditions which do not exist
save as legal conceptions." Dissent of Ch. J.
Biggs in United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192
F.2d 540, 567 (3d Cir. 1951). See Guttnacher,
The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness, 22 U. CHIi.
L. REV. 325, 329 (1955).
41 See GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, op. c't. supra
note 37, at 406; Karpman, On Reducing Tensions
and Bridging Gaps Between Psychiatry and the
Law, 48 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 164 (1957); "Many
psychiatrists seem to resent a stuation in which
they are compelled to speak a language not their
own. ... Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem
of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. PA. L. REV.
378, 380 (1952).
4-"... [T]he Rules did not profess to define
insanity but merely to define the condition of
mind in which a person pleading insanity was to
be regarded as absolved from criminal responsi-
bility for his unlawful acts." Royal Commission
on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, REPORT, Cmd.
No. 8932, at 87 (1953).
43 See Keedy, Irresistible Impulse as a Defense in
the Criminal Law, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 956, 993
(1952); cf. Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640
(9th Cir. 1957).
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concepts of right and wrong are essential. 44
To the contention that the psychiatrist can-
not testify in meaningless, popular terms,
the rejoinder is that the experts' polysyl-
labic patois 45 should be accommodated to
the jury. 4" A suggested compromise is the
trained jury or panel; 47 this meets, however,
the general aversion to blue ribbon juries 48
as well as the particular difficulty of choos-
ing from among psychiatric schools, or
finding impartial psychiatrists.
4
"
A third challenge to M'Naghten is the
criticism of the use of any test or symptom
to determine responsibility."° In medical
44 "In our view the question of responsibility is
not primarily a question of medicine any more
than it is a question of law. It is essentially a moral
question, with which the law is intimately con-
cerned and to whose solution medicine can bring
valuable aid, and it is one which is most appro-
priately decided by a jury of ordinary men and
women, not by medical or legal experts." Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953,
REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932, at 100 (1953).
45 "In light of the esoteric nomenclature used in
the field, and the hypertechnical divergence be-
tween various schools of psychiatric thought, as
well as because of the complexity and sheer un-
certainty of the area under exploration, it can
readily be imagined what wholesale want of en-
lightenment would eventuate from purely medical
testimony from the witness-psychiatrist." Un'ted
States v. Smith, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 324, 17
C.M.R. 314, 324 (1954), rev'd on other grounds
sub noln. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
46 Judge Sobeloff concedes this: "If psychiatry is
to provide maximum guidance and assistance to
juries, psychiatric witnesses must learn to avoid
technical jargon which baffles laymen." Sobeloff,
Insanity and the Criminal Law: Front McNaghten
to Durham, and Beyond, 41 A.B.A.J. 793, 879
(1955).
4T Ehrlich, Psychiatry v. McNaughton Formula,
138 N.Y.L.J. No. 84, p. 4, col. I (Oct. 28, 1957),
at No. 86, p. 4, col. 3 (Oct. 30, 1957).
48 See, e.g., a New York bill to abolish blue rib-
bon juries. S. Int. No. 887 (1958).
4) DAVIDSON, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 74-75 (1952),
noted in Fay, The Practical Role of Psychiatry in
the Effective Practice of Law, 29 TEMP. L.Q. 327,
328 (1956).
50 This is the essential premise of the New Hamp-
practice the total condition of the patient,
including all symptoms, is analyzed to de-
termine the etiology and status of his ill-
ness. All evidence of his mental condition
should similarly be introduced at a trial,
particularly in recognition of the recent
scientific use of electroencephalograms,
spinal lumbar punctures and other media
to study brain activity.5 '
The courts are skeptical of this argument
since it, in effect, proposes to abolish a
standard by which the jury may measure a
defendant's responsibility. 52 To remove all
tests leaves the jury on its own to evaluate
conflicting testimony; admission of any evi-
dence on mental disorder gives the psychi-
atric expert carte blanche to introduce any
theory.' Scientific devices are largely use-
shire and Durham cases. See text infra.
51 See United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192
F.2d 540, 565 (3d Cir. 1951) (dissenting opin-
ion); Weihofen, Crime, Law, and Psychiatry, 4
KAN. L. REV. 377, 394-95 (1956). It has been
charged that an inconsistency exists between use
of scientific devices by the courts and the non-
recognition of the field of psychiatry. Ehrlich,
supra note 47, at No. 87, p. 4, col. 3 (Oct. 31,
1957).
52 "The majority of witnesses, however, were
opposed to the suggestion that the M'Naghten
Rules should be abrogated and that the jury
should be left to decide the issue of responsibility
without the aid of any legal criterion." Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953,
REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932, at 97 (1953).
,-' "The critics of the M'Naghten Rules readily ad-
mitted the difficulty of deciding what should be
put in their place. The majority considered that it
would be unwise to dispense with any formula
and simply leave the jury to determine on all the
evidence whether the accused was insane or irre-
sponsible. They felt that this would leave too
difficult an issue to the jury, who would ask for
further guidance and were entitled to receive it,
and it would give too much latitude to psychia-
trists. It was necessary to have some fixed stand-
ard which the jury could apply in face of 'the
vagaries of a fluid and evolving science' and
which would help to judge in charging the jury."
Id. at 106.
ful only for analysis of physiological dis-
orders-somatopsychic (organic psychoses)
rather than purely psychic.5 4
Existing Modifications and Substitutes
The modification of the M'Naghten rule
which has attained widest acceptance is the
"irresistible impulse" test.55 It recognizes
impairment of the will, holding defendant
not responsible, even though he knew the
nature and quality of his act and its wrong-
fulness, if he was unable to resist it due to
deprivation of will power.5" The clarity of
the term is open to some doubt: an irresis-
tible act could never be resisted; impulse
suggests momentary urge.5
7
This test is not a substitute for the
M'Naghten rule but rather an additional
exculpatory factor-a third branch to the
rule. While approved in at least fourteen
54 Most severe mental disorders are not organic
in origin. CAVANAGH & McGOLDRICK, FUNDA-
MENTAL PSYCHIATRY 31, 48 (t953); Karpman,
On Reducing Tensions and Bridging Gaps Be-
tween Psychiatry and the Law, 48 J. CRIM. L.,
C. & P.S. 164, 166 (1957). See Hall, Responsi-
bility and Law: In Defense of the McNaghten
Rules, 42 A.B.A.J. 917, 918-19 (1956). "...
[C]linical analysis consists largely of case history,
a reconstruction of the patient's experiences. The
essence of this method is the use of empathy,
the sensitive re-living of the patient's experience.
It is widely recognized that such analysis would
be grossly inadequate if the analyst did not attain
considerable insight into the patient's scheme of
values. This requires a reliving of his moral con-
flicts and evaluations, including their appraisal on
moral grounds." Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal
Responsibility, 65 YALE L.J. 761, 782 (1956).
55 See Keedy, Irresistible Inpulse as a Defense in
the Criminal Law, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 956 (1952).
56 Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 549 (D.C. Cir.
1929).
57 GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND
THE LAW 410 (1952). Judge Biggs poses the
problem differently: ". . . [lit would seem that
any impulse which is not resisted is by definition
irresistible." United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi,
192 F.2d 540, 568 (3d Cir. 1951) (dissenting
opinion).
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states and the federal jurisdictions,58 there
is no current trend toward wider adoption
since it has been specifically rejected in sev-
eral states.59 In New York the statutory
formulation of a test has precluded the use
of any supplement.6 °
The "irresistible impulse" test was ac-
cepted in this country in Ohio in 18341
and was later more precisely set forth as
exonerating the defendant where
... by reason of the duress of such mental
disease, he had so far lost the power to
choose between the right and wrong, and to
avoid doing the act in question, as that his
free agency was at the time destroyed .... 62
An effective argument for the rule was sei
forth in the case of Parsons v. State.63 The
opinion indicated the two constituent ele-
ments of legal responsibility as capacity of
intellectual discrimination and freedom of
the will and concluded that the criminal in-
sanity doctrine ought to include exonera-
tion for impairment of the will caused by
mental disease whereby one commits a
crime he could not avoid. This supple-
mentary test, which would seem to meet the
central objection to the M'Naghten rule by
its recognition of volitional impairment,
has been criticized nevertheless from two
aspects. One theory is that no impulse is
truly incapable of being resisted and that
the test represents the abnegation of will
58 ALl, MODEL PENAL CODE, Appendix A § 4.01,
at 161 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). Additionally, it
was approved by the Supreme Court in Davis v.
United States, 165 U.S. 373 (1897).
,9 See Keedy, supra note 55, at 980-82.
60 People v. Silverman, 181 N.Y. 235, 73 N.E. 980
(1905); People v. Carpenter, 102 N.Y. 238, 6
N.E. 584 (1886).
61lState v. Thompson, Wright's Ohio Rep. 617
(1834).
62 Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 866
(1887).
03 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887).
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power.6 4 The other view is that the test
does not go far enough: the use of "im-
pulse" excludes mental disorder typified by
brooding and melancholia which may also
impair the will to an extent where the act is
unavoidable.65 In New York, an example
of this latter situation might be the Horton
case.66
It has been suggested that an expression
to cover volitional impairment, one that is
both more accurate and useable, is "unre-
sisted urge." Dr. Cavanagh believes the
term "urge" to be medically correct, as well
as wide enough to include non-impulsive
but nevertheless insane behavior as above
described.6 7 For the military jurisdiction
the Manual tor Courts-Martial takes the
broad approach in its version of the "irre-
sistible impulse" gloss to M'Naghten:
A person is not mentally responsible in a
criminal sense for an offense unless he was,
at the time, so far free from mental defect,
disease, or derangement as to be able con-
cerning the particular act charged both to
distinguish right from wrong and to adhere
to the right.68
A revolutionary event in the controver-
sial course of the M'Naghten rule was the
64 Baron Bramwell asked: "Would the prisoner
have committed the act if there had been a police-
man at his elbow?" S. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 265 n.2 (1925); Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953,
REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932, at 103 (1953). This is a
test of "irresistible impulse" in the military juris-
diction. See United States v. Smith, 5 U.S.C.M.A.
314, 17 C.M.R. 314 (1954), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957); Hall, Responsibility and Law: In Defense
of the McNaghten Rules, 42 A.B.A.J. 917 (1956).
65 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874
(D.C. Cir. 1954) (dictum); GUTTMACHER &
WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 410-12
(1952).
66 People v. Horton, 308 N.Y. 1, 123 N.E.2d 609
(1954)..67 Cavanagh, A Psychiatrist Looks at the Durham
Decision, 5 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 25, 42-43 (1955).
68 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 200 (1951).
1954 Durham9 case where the rule was
rejected as the sole test of criminal respon-
sibility for the District of Columbia.70 Al-
though the court referred to the "enormous
development in knowledge of mental life"
the rule it adopted was the eighty-year-old
New Hampshire "product" rule:
It is simply that an accused is not crimi-
nally responsible if his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or mental de-
fect. We use "disease" in the sense of a con-
dition which is considered capable of either
improving or deteriorating. We use "defect"
in the sense of a condition which is not
considered capable of either improving or
deteriorating and which may be either con-
genital, or the result of injury, or the resid-
ual effect of a physical or mental disease. 71
The decision was acclaimed by psychiatrists
generally and greeted skeptically by the
legal profession. However, there were ex-
ceptions within both groups.7"
111) Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).
70 The M'Naghten rule had been adopted in the
District of Columbia in United States v. Guiteau,
I Mackey 498 (D.C. Sup. Ct. 1882), and later
supplemented by the "irresistible impulse" test in
Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir.
1929).
71 Durham v. United States, supra note 69, at
874-75.
72 Legal comments ran from "careful and psycho-
logically literate," Kalven, Insanity and the Crimi-
nal Law - A Critique of Durham v. United States,
Introduction, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 318 (1955),
to "... a legal principle beclouded by a central
ambiguity, both unexplained and unsupported by
its basic rationale ... ," Wechsler, The Criteria of
Criminal Responsibility, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 367,
373 (1955), and ". . . the abdication of responsi-
bility for determining the standard of criminal
responsibility. ... Sauer v. United States, 241
F.2d 640, 647 (9th Cir. 1957). Dissents from a
few psychiatrists described the opinion as "insuffi-
cient and on shaky ground," Wertham, Psycho-
atthoritarianism and the Law, 22 U. CHI. L. REV.
336, 337 (1955), and, somewhat rpre strongly,
as "unadulterated nonsense," Szasz, Psychiatry,
Ethics, and the Criminal Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV.
183, 190 (1958). See Morris, Criminal Insanity:
Since the Durham case represents the
only significant judicial assault upon the
M'Naghten rule, it deserves close consider-
ation. There were several unusual aspects
to the case: the crime involved was not
homicide,73 the court reversed on grounds
other than the insanity test (which there-
fore appeared to be dictum but which it set
down as the law prospectively), and the
court utilized non-legal materials exten-
sively. The district court had convicted
Durham of housebreaking, Judge Holtzoff,
applying M'Naghten with "irresistible im-
pulse," having rejected the insanity defense
at trial for failure of evidence of unsound
mind at the time of the crime. The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed, holding that the lower court erred
in failing to find some evidence to rebut
the usual presumption of sanity. The court
then specifically rejected M'Naghten as
the sole test and ordered the application
of the New Hampshire "product" rule on
retrial.7 4
The controversy that subsequently arose
highlighted the decision's liberality. Aboli-
tion of any legal test of criminal responsi-
bility is at once the merit of the case,
according to adherents, and its most deplor-
able aspect, according to critics. Judge
Sobeloff praises it for permitting ". . . as
broad an inquiry as may be found necessary
according to the latest accepted scientific
criteria."7" Authorities on both sides agree
The Abyss Between Law and Psychiatry, 12
RECORD of N.Y.C.B.A. 171 (1957).
7M It has been pointed Out that the insanity defense
has been heretofore seized upon primarily by
those accused of homicide. GUTTMACHER & WEI-
HOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 414 (1952);
Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Wit-
ness, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 325, 327 (1955).
74 See State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869).
Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law: From
McNaghten to Durham, and Beyond, 41 A.B.A.J.
793, 795 (1955).
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that the door is opened wide for psychiatric
testimony running to the whole picture of
the defendant's mental condition. The new
rule allows evidence on all aspects of men-
tal condition affecting behavior - impair-
ment of cognition, volition, and affection
and the influence of the subconscious. Tes-
timony will be less restricted; psychiatrists
may utilize concepts which are more mean-
ingful to them.7 1
On the other side, it is claimed that too
much power is given to the psychiatrist by
the absence of any test for the jury. The
overall effect is to reduce the judge's role
and subject the jury to the experts' diverse
theories. 77 Dr. Guttmacher admits that the
New Hampshire "product" test, now re-
ferred to as the Durham rule, has ". . . the
tendency to make the psychiatrist, in large
measure, the arbiter. '78 Objection to the
70; Zilboorg, A Step Toward Enlightened Justice,
22 U. CHI. L. REV. 331, 334 (1955).
77 Professor Wharton's early appraisal of the New
Hampshire rule pointed out that "mental disease
... in fact is a term so indeterminate and vague,
that to leave the question to the jury with the
instruction here criticised is to leave it to them
without any instructions at all." WHARTON &
STILLE, I MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 178 (5th ed.
1905), as quoted by WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A
DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW 82 (1933). See also
United States v. Smith, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 324,
17 C.M.R. 314, 324 (1954) (dictum), rev'd on
other grounds sub noma. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1 (1957); de Grazia, The Distinction of Being
Mad, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 345 (1955).
78 Correspondence between Dr. Guttmacher and
Professor Wechsler, ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE,
Appendix C § 4.01, at 188 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955). But Judge Bazelon who enuciated the
Durham rule has subsequently defended it from
the charge of delegating too much authority to
the experts. ". . . [W]hether petitioner was suffer-
ing from such 'mental disease' or 'mental defect,'
... would be determined by the trier of the facts,
not by the psychiatric witnesses. The witnesses'
role would be to supply to the trier of the facts
the data upon which the determination can be
made." Briscoe v. United States, 248 F.2d 640,
643-44 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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increased influence of the psychiatrist ought
not be passed over as merely fear of en-
croachment upon judicial prerogative. 79
While Durham emphasizes the "science" of
psychiatry,80 the admission that psychiatry
is "more of art than of science" 1 is still
conceded by psychiatrists and the psychi-
atrically oriented. 82
The abolition of a norm and the in-
creased influence of the expert witness
would seem to lead to greater ad hoc deter-
mination of responsibility. 8:3 The jury would
pass on the individual merits; psychiatry
seems to favor this approach since punish-
ment should fit the criminal, not the
crime.8 4 This is adverse, however, to the
legal concept of a standard for all with,
traditionally, punishment accorded to the
crime. 8-
79 See Commonwealth v. Patskin, 375 Pa. 368,
100 A.2d 472 (1953). Few, however, would vo'ce
their skept'c.sm as trenchantly as one commenta-
tor: ". . . [T]he medical expert has become a
stench in the nostrils of upright judges." Morgan,
Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert
Testimony by Rules of Evidence, 10 U. Cmi. L.
REV. 285, 292-93 (1943).
8ODurham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 871
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
81 Sullivan, Psychiatry, 12 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 578,
580 (1933).
82 Cavanagh, A Psychiatrist Looks at the Durham
Decision, 5 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 25, 26 (1955);
Douglas, The Durham Rule: A Meeting Ground
for Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 4! IOWA L. REV.
485, 494 (1956). See Menninger, "Psychiatry and
The Law" - A Dual Review, 38 IOWA L. REV.
687, 701 (1953).
83 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment,
1949-1953, REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932, at 114-15
(1953).
84 See Karpman, On Reducing Tensions and
Bridging Gaps Between Psychiatry and the Law,
48 J. CRIM. L., C & P.S. 164 (1957); Waelder,
Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal Responsi-
biFty, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 378 (1952).
8Equal protection of the laws' in turn in-
cludes the right to be tried and punished in the
same manner as others accused of crime are tried
and punished. ... Lynch v. United States, 189
F.2d 476, 479 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
A turther objection posited to Durham,
as a substitute for MNaghten, is its elimi-
nation of the ethical concept. To the psy-
chiatrist, this is medically sound if he
believes that moral right and wrong are
meaningless in the analysis of mental dis-
turbances.8" To critics this represents the
elimination of the very basis of criminal
responsibility.87 This conflict is no newer
than that over the historic rule itself.
Particular problems are introduced by
the terminology of the Durham rule. Fail-
ure to define mental disease and mental
defect increases the problem of drawing the
line on responsibility. Realizing that from
the medical viewpoint there are no black
and white distinctions in this area, never-
theless, the criminal law demands that
some grouping finally be made."8 This is
of little interest to the psychiatrist whose
concern is treatment.8" Psychiatrists will
agree on only certain categorizations - e.g.,
psychotics will usually be criminally irre-
sponsible, neurotics not so.!" Between the
831 (1951); cf. Royal Commission on Captal
Pun'shment, 1949-1953, REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932,
at 97 (1953).
81; See, e.g., Karpman, supra note 84, at 164.
87 Hall, Respons'bility and Law: In Defense of the
McNaghten Rules, 42 A.B.A.J. 917-18 (1956).
88 ". . [T]o the psychiatrist mental cases are a
series of imperceptible gradations from the mild
psychopath to the extreme psychotic, whereas
criminal law allows for no gradations. It requires
a final decisive moral judgment of the culpability
of the accused." Holloway v. United States, 148
F.2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (dictum); Gutt-
macher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness, 22
U. Cm. L. REV. 325, 328 (1955).
81) B. Glueck, Changing Concepts in Forensic
Psychiatry, 45 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 123 (1954);
Karpman, On Reducing Tensions and Bridging
Gaps Between Psychiatry and the Law, 48 J.
CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 164 (1957); Waelder, Psychi-
atry' and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility,
101 U. PA. L. REV. 378 (1952).
110 The Royal Commission found insanity regarded
medically to mean that "the patient is suffering
from a major mental disease (usually a psycho-
extremes lies the large shadow area of the
social psychopath; the problem would be
how to apply the Durham rule here. 91 Fol-
lowing the integration of personality theory,
all behavior of the mentally disturbed
seems influenced to some degree by their
mental condition. If the burden is to be on
the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the criminal act was not the
product of the mental disorder, 92 this be-
comes heavy indeed when we consider that
mental abnormality differs from normality
only quantitatively, not qualitatively. 93 In
short, since the gradation is but a con-
tinuum from the merely eccentric to the
psychotic, the Durham rule encourages use
of the insanity defense. 94 The possibility of
abuse is enhanced by the view of many
psychiatrists that criminal behavior is evi-
dence per se of mental abnormality. 95
However, response to the Durham rule
in the courts has been limited. In Andersen
v. United States, 6 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a
counterfeiting conviction where the district
sis)." Royal Commission on Capital Punishment.
1949-1953, REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932, at 73
(1953).
91 "The so-called 'borderline cases,' the psycho-
paths and the severe character neurotics, will
still prove to be the difficult cases under the new
rule." Guttmacher, supra note 88, at 328.
92 See Briscoe v. United States, 248 F.2d 640, 643
(D.C. Cir. 1957); GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN,
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 421 (1952).
93 CAVANAGH & McGOLDRICK, FUNDAMENTAL
PSYCHIATRY 21-23 (1953).
94 A judge in the District of Columbia warned:
"The defense of insanity is going to be used by
every other defendant who comes into this court."
Schweinhaut, J., Washington Evening Star, Nov.
10, 1954, as quoted in Comment, 5 CATHOLIC
U.L. REV. 63, 84 (1955).
95 See Karpman, On Reducing Tensions and
Bridging Gaps Between Psychiatry and the Law,
48 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 164, 168 (1957); Roche,
Criminality and Mental Illness - Two Faces of
the Same Coin, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 320 (1955).
96 237 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1956).
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court had refused to charge the Durham
rule to the jury, and cited the Supreme
Court's approval of the M'Naghten rule
with the "irresistible impulse" modification.
The court refused to ". . . join the courts of
New Hampshire and the District of Colum-
bia in their 'magnificent isolation' of rebel-
lion against M'Naghten. . ... ,,1 In Sauer v.
United States, s where the insanity instruc-
tion was the only ground of appeal, the
same circuit extensively considered and
reaffirmed its rejection of Durham. The
Court of Military Appeals, in United States
v. Smith,'"' indicated it would be hesitant
to adopt the Durham approach for the
military establishment. In Howard v.
United States,0 0 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not have
the insanity test squarely before it. It noted,
however, the Supreme Court's approval of
the M'Naghten test and the Durham court's
"... considerable degree of autonomy with
respect to law enforcement in the Dis-
trict."''1 In the state courts, the Durham
rule has thus far attracted little support.
Maryland' 0 2 and Montana' 0 3 considered it
and adhered to. M'Naghten; Indiana' °4
criticized Durham's vagueness on causality;
97 Andersen v. United States, 237 F.2d 118, 127
(9th Cir. 1956). "Rather than stumble along with
Pike, we prefer to trudge along the now well-
traveled pike blazed more than a century ago by
M'Naghten." Ibid.
98 241 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1957).
995 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 17 C.M.R. 314 (1954),
rev'd on other grounds sub noin. Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1 (1957).
100 232 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1956).
101 Howard v. United States, 232 F.2d 274, 275
(5th Cir. 1956).
102 Thomas v. State, 206 Md. 575, 112 A.2d 913
(1955).
103 State v. Kitchens, 129 Mont. 331, 286 P.2d
1079 (1955).
04 Flowers v. State, 139 N.E.2d 185, 194 (Ind.
1956).
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in California, 105 where a statute is involved,
the court directed proposals for change to
the legislature.
Proposed Substitutions for the
M'Naghten Rule
The American Law Institute Model
Penal Code proposes a test for criminal
responsibility which strives for a middle
ground between the M'Naghten and the
Durham rules:
I) a person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct
as a result of mental disease or defect
he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law.
2) The terms "mental disease or defect" do
not include an abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal or otherwise
anti-social conduct.10 6
In attempting to take into account impair-
ment of volitional capacity, the proposal
rejects the "irresistible impulse" test on
the usual criticism that it is ". . . inept in
so far as it may be impliedly restricted to
sudden, spontaneous acts as distinguished
from insane propulsions that are accom-
panied by brooding or reflection.' 0 The
comments of the ALI accompanying the
proposal conclude, however, that ".
attacks on the M'Naghten rule as an inept
definition of insanity or as an arbitrary
definition in terms of special symptoms are
entirely misconceived.' 08 This is directed
at the Durham position which found
M'Naghten both an attempt to define insan-
105 People v. Ryan, 140 Cal. App. 2d 412, 295
P.2d 496 (1956).
106 ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1955).
107 ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, Comments 157
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
tS Id. at 156.
ity and an incorrect definition in terms of a
symptom. The ALI draft apparently ac-
cepts the M'Naghten rule as at least setting
forth "minimal elements of rationality" 10 9
in the absence of which punishment would
be unjust. It extends recognition to impair-
ment of volition in the broad sense (i.e.,
not limited to irresistible impulse).
A weakness of the proposal is that it
seems to introduce the Durham rule's
causality problem by its use of the term
"result." A further difficulty, considered by
the ALI reporter, flows from the nebulosity
of "substantial impairment." 110 Between
some impairment of cognition and volition
and impairment sufficient to exculpate from
responsibility a line must finally be drawn.
In an effort to meet this problem, the alter-
native proposal of the ALI submits the
general issue of justice to the jury:
A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a
result of mental disease or defect his capac-
ity either to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law is so substantially
impaired that he cannot justly be held
responsible." I
This alternative test may be compared to
the majority recommendation of the Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment in this
area.
A Royal Commission, created in Eng-
land in 1949 to study the capital punish-
ment question, extensively considered the
M'Naghten rule." 2 Appropriately enough,
the criminal responsibility aspect of its
109 Ibid.
110 Id. at 158-59. See Sobeloff, Insanity and the
Criminal Law: Fron McNaghten to Durham, and
Beyond, 41 A.B.A.J. 793, 878 (1955).
11 ALl, MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, alternative
formulation (a) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
112 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment,
1949-1953, REPORT, Cmd, No, 8932 (1953),
report, completed in 1953 and. covering
several related areas, brought forth its only
dissents. The Commission's study assumes
significance, not only because of its intrin-
sic merit, but also because of its influence
upon the Durham case decided in the fol-
lowing year.
The eleven-member Commission, with
one dissent, agreed that the M'Naghten test
of responsibility ought to be changed. Of
the ten favoring a change, abrogation was
favored by a majority, an extension of the
rule favored by a minority. 13 The majority
felt it should be left to the jury ". . . to
determine whether at the time of the act
the accused was suffering from disease of
the mind (or mental deficiency) to such a
degree that he ought not to be held respon-
sible." 1 4 This proposal is similar to alter-
native (1) of the American Law Institute
as set forth supra. The three-member
minority of the Commission preferred to
amend the rule by the addition of a third
branch covering volitional impairment
along these lines:
The jury must be satisfied that, at the
time of committing the act, the accused, as
a result of disease of the mind (or mental
deficiency) (a) did not know the nature and
quality of the act or (b) did not know that
it was wrong or (c) was incapable of pre-
venting himself from committing it." ,
The majority recommendation was criti-
cized by the minority primarily for failure
of evidence from the Commission witnesses
in its support.'' 6 As a result it was felt that
so crucial an issue needed ". . . weighty
argument . . . to justify the adoption of a
course which has found so few advocates
113 Id. at 116.
114 Ibid.
il Id, at 111, 116.
116 Memorandum of Dissent, Royal Commission
on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, REPORT, Cmd.
No. 8932, at 285 (1953).
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among those who give evidence to the
Commission. '11 7 The minority found the
arguments for abrogation insufficient:
From the difficulties of the matter we
cannot infer that the law should be allowed
to shirk its duty by requiring the jury to
come to a decision without the guidance of
a general principle or criterion .... The fact
that the criterion of responsibility cannot
be defined with complete scientific precision
is not a sufficient reason for not defining it
at all. 118
The najority felt that the extension of
the rule proposed by the minority would be
inadequate in practice and focused its criti-
cism on the difficulty of interpreting the
words "incapable of preventing himself."
A liberal interpretation of this phrase was
held necessary -
... meaning not merely that the accused
was incapable of preventing himself if he
had tried to do so, but that he was incapable
of wishing or of trying to prevent himself,
or incapable of realising or attending to con-
siderations which might have prevented him
if he had been capable of realising or attend-
ing to them.' 19
A narrow approach, the majority feared, of
the third branch recommendation of the
minority, would not serve the purpose of
the rule. As to the objection raised to the
elimination altogether of a test for the jury
of criminal responsibility, the majority
view was that some critics made ". . . too
low an estimate of the capacity and com-
mon sense of juries....,,_(
As another possible modification of the
M'Naghten rule, it has been suggested by a
vigorous supporter of the test that its cur-
rent terminology be retained but a wider
117 Id. at 286.
118 Id. at 286-87.
119 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment,
1949-1953, REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932, at Ill
(1953).
1'2 0 Id. at 115.
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interpretation given to the term "know"
to connote "understand" and "realize.' 121
This approach pursues the theory of inte-
gration of psychological functions:
... to know that an act is morally wrong
means more than merely conventional or
logical recognition of its immorality. It
means that the knowledge is permeated by
feeling, that a person has assimilated the
knowledge into his self and not that, as an
icy spectator or in mere lip-service, he
acknowledges that he "knew," etc. 122
Conclusions
Most authorities, legal and medical,
agree that a change in the M'Naghten rule
is warranted. The controversy swirls about
the extent and direction of the change and
the spectrum of opinion is wide. At one
extreme stand those favoring complete
abrogation of the existing rule; this is the
approach of New Hampshire, the District
of Columbia, many psychiatrists and the
Royal Commission majority. At the other
extreme are adherents of the rule as a tried
and adequate test, perhaps conceding a
slight modification in interpretation; this
is the approach of some courts and many
prosecution officials. Between lie the modi-
fications, primarily directed at extension of
the rule to cover volitional and emotional
impairment while retaining the concept of
right and wrong and the emphasis upon
rationality as the test's principal criterion.
The intensity of the controversy can be
understood to some extent in the differ-
ences in training, viewpoint and objectives
of the legal and medical professions. The
law's societal approach is concerned with
order in the community, with establishment
of standards to which all citizens ,may look
121 Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility,
65 YALE LJ. 761, 781-82 (1956).
122 Hall & Menninger, "Psychiatry and the Law"
- A Dual Review, 38 IOWA L. REV. 687, 696
(1953).
- punishment therefore, according to the
crime and as determined by the penal law.
The psychiatrist's approach is individual-
oriented - concerned with treatment of the
patient in his particular physical or psychic
disorder, and not with the organization of
society as a group.' 23 The immediate issue,
however, is fundamentally an ethical one
and the test is of responsibility, not of
medical insanity.
The paucity of legal support for the
Durham rule and the testimony taken in
the United States and England by the
Royal Commission 124 evidence preference
for retention of the M'Naghten rule. This
accords with the law's generally conserva-
tive approach.1 25 Additionally, the courts
retain doubts as to the approach of the
field of psychiatry. Not only is divergence
noted within the field itself, but the philo-
sophic attitude of some of its spokesmen
is, in its determinism and positivism,
1 2 6
123 Id. at 699; Cavanagh, A Psychiatrist Looks at
the Durham Decision, 5 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 25,
26 (1955).
124 "Both the psychiatrists and the academic law-
yers who gave evidence before us in the United
States unanimously criticised the M'Naghten
Rules as obsolete and inadequate .... The major-
ity of the judges and practising lawyers, on the
other hand, supported the M'Naghten Rules, on
the ground that they were a good practical test
and that it was not possible to devise a better one."
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-
1953, REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932, at 106 (1953).
125 "The right and wrong test has withstood the
onslaught of critics, not because it is scientifically
perfect, but because the courts regard it as the
best criteria [sic] yet articulated for ascertaining
criminal responsibility which comports with the
moral feelings of the community." Sauer v. United
States, 241 F.2d 640, 649 (9th Cir. 1957).
126 E.g., "This philosophy is based on the concept
of 'free will,' that man is free to exercise his will
for good or evil. While there may be absolute
values of good and evil in a moral sense, it is
obvious that legally there cannot be such absolute
evaluations, that good and evil are relative values,
repugnant to a legal tradition imbued with
Christian concepts of free will and indi-
vidual responsibility.
There is, nevertheless, general accept-
ance of the validity of the key complaint
against the rule in its present form. Recog-
nition should be made of impairment of
the intellect by the emotional and volitional
faculties due to mental disorder. It was in
agreement that this deficiency existed that
many states accepted the "irresistible im-
pulse" doctrine, even in its inadequate
scope and difficult application.
Amendment of the rule for this inclusion
would be better accomplished by the addi-
tion of a third branch rather than by a
revamping of the entire test. A total rewrit-
ing is not warranted by the need to recog-
nize an additional exculpating factor. The
test has worked well - abandonment would
be but concession to critics of "outdated
concepts of right and wrong."
Recognizing volitional and emotional
impairment in addition to intellectual dis-
turbance has been the direction of nearly
all proposed changes in the M'Naghten
rule. This was the view of the Parsons v.
State 27 decision, the objective of the ALI,
and the twofold provision of several of the
European codes.' 28 The difficulty is in
and shift with the changes in social attitudes."
B. Glueck, Changing Concepts in Forensic Psy-
chiatry, 45 1. CIM. L., C. & P.S. 123, 126 (1954).
". .. [D]eterminism as a framework for the
criminal law appears to be scientifically more de-
fensible than a framework of moral responsibility.
... " Kaplan, Barriers to the Establishment of a
Deterministic Criminal Law, 46 Ky. L.J. 103, 111
(1957).
127 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887).
128 The Royal Commission, in considering the
addition of a third limb to M'Naghten, was im-
pressed by some of the Continental codes, par-
ticularly the Swiss provision whereby a defendant
is exculpated when "... . incapable of appreciating
the unlawful nature of his act or of acting in
accordance with this appreciation .. " Swiss
PENAL CODE art. 10, quoted in Royal Commission
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formulating the addition. In effect, the
Durham court and the Royal Commission
capitulate to this inherent difficulty and
abolish the standard outright in shifting the
problem to psychiatric experts and jury-
men. The ALI proposal, though purport-
edly striving for a middle course, rewrites
the rule, beclouds it by substituting appre-
ciation of the criminality of conduct for
knowledge of the nature of the act and its
wrongfulness, and, thereby, also rejects the
New York concept of "wrong" from a
moral viewpoint.
The addition to the existing rule of a
third branch to cover volitional impairment
is the course recommended by the Royal
Commission minority. Substantively, it
follows the reasoning of Parsons v. State,12
9
but is broader than "irresistible impulse,"
and was the test adopted by New Mexico in
State v. White130 in 1954:
Assuming defendant's knowledge of the
nature and quality of his act and his knowl-
edge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of
disease of the mind, defendant has been
deprived of or lost the power of his will
which would enable him to prevent himself
from doing the act, then he cannot be found
guilty.1' .
Radical solutions to a problem which
will always be difficult, such as the -aboli-
tion of legal guides to jurors, or the whole-
sale introduction of treatment in lieu of
punishment, will result in chaotic and in-
effectual administration of criminal law. It
would seem preferable to draft an addition
along the line advocated which would meet
much of the valid criticism of the current
New York statute, and yet retain the fun-
damental ethical concepts embodied in the
basic rule.
on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, REPORT, Cmd.
No. 8932, at 110, 413 (1953).
12981 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887).
1'30 58 N.M. 324, 270 P.2d 727 (1954).
'V" Id. at -, 270 P.2d at 730.
